In 50 years of international civil nuclear energy generation, no uranium traded for electricity production has ever been diverted for military use. No weapons program has ever arisen out of civil nuclear power. Civil plutonium is unsuitable for weapons, but is also subject to rigorous accounting and auditing under the international safeguards system.
Australia's uranium is sold for exclusively peaceful purposes, namely electric power generation and related research and development activities. Australia itself is almost the only developed country not using any electricity generated by nuclear power.
The main components of Australia's safeguards policy are:
- Careful selection of those countries eligible for the supply of Australian uranium:
- In the case of non-nuclear-weapons states, sales are made only to countries which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These have renounced the nuclear weapons option and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards applying to all their nuclear-related activities;
- In the case of nuclear weapons states, which must also be parties to the NPT, sales require an assurance that uranium will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes and that it will be subject to IAEA safeguards.
- Countries wishing to import Australian uranium must conclude a bilateral safeguards agreement with Australia. Provisions include:
- prior Australian consent to any Australian obligated nuclear material (AONM) being transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20% uranium-235, or reprocessed. Transfers are permitted only within Australia's network of bilateral safeguards. fallback safeguards (contingency arrangements to ensure the continued safeguarding of material already present in an importing country in case safeguards under the NPT ever cease to apply);
- Strong support for the NPT and IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, with IAEA monitoring to apply.
The cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is the NPT and the associated safeguards provided by the verification regime of the IAEA.
The NPT's main objective is that states have a right of access to the peaceful use of nuclear power in return for accepting that they won't use such programs to work towards developing nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons states also accepted to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament.
Uranium processed for electricity generation is not useable for weapons. The uranium used in power reactor fuel for electricity generation is typically enriched to about 3-4% of the isotope U-235, compared with weapons-grade which is over 90% U-235. For safeguards purposes uranium is deemed to be "highly enriched" when it reaches 20% U-235. Few countries possess the technological knowledge or the facilities to produce weapons-grade uranium.
Plutonium is produced in the reactor core from a proportion of the uranium fuel. Plutonium contained in spent fuel elements is typically about 60-70% Pu-239, compared with weapons-grade plutonium which is more than 93% Pu-239. Weapons-grade plutonium is not produced in commercial power reactors but in a "production" reactor operated with frequent fuel changes to produce low-burnup material with a high proportion of Pu-239.
The only use for "reactor grade" plutonium is as a nuclear fuel, after it is separated from the high-level wastes by reprocessing. It is not and has never been used for weapons, due to the relatively high rate of spontaneous fission and radiation from the heavier isotopes such as Pu-240 making any such attempted use fraught with great uncertainties.
